A Summary Of The Logic & Reasoning Behind
The Iowa Supreme Court's "Varnum v. Brien" Ruling

Also, in light of the ruling, please see our page of General Authority and Gospel Scholar quotes regarding protecting and respecting the civil rights and equality of all people and "liken them unto" this ruling.

This lawsuit originated when a number of same-sex couples were denied marriage licenses. After the Iowa District Court for Polk County ruled in favor of these couples. The county appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court which issued a unanimous decision in favor of the couples thereby eliminating the state-wide ban on same-sex marriage. As stated, most of the text below comes directly from the Iowa Supreme Court's decision.

The Court stated all of the following text within the quotation marks -

"A statute inconsistent with the Iowa Constitution must be declared void, even though it may be supported by strong and deep-seated traditional beliefs and popular opinion."

Regarding unpopular groups, we need "to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials." In other words, we must adhere to our republican ideals of constitutional rights for all, even the weak and unpopular.

"Our responsibility, however, is to protect constitutional rights of individuals from legislative enactments that have denied those rights, even when the rights have not yet been broadly accepted, were at one time unimagined, or challenge a deeply ingrained practice or law viewed to be impervious to the passage of time."

"As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes poignantly said, 'It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.' "

"They (the plaintiffs) seek to declare the marriage statute unconstitutional so they can obtain the array of benefits of marriage enjoyed by heterosexual couples, protect themselves and their children, and demonstrate to one another and to society their mutual commitment."

"This record included an explanation by some of the plaintiffs of the disadvantages and fears they face each day due to the inability to obtain a civil marriage in Iowa. These disadvantages and problems include the legal inability to make many life and death decisions affecting their partner, including decisions related to health care, burial arrangements, autopsy, and disposition of remains following death. Various plaintiffs told of the inability to share in their partners' state-provided health insurance, public- employee pension benefits, and many private-employer-provided benefits and protections. They also explained how several tax benefits are denied. Adoption proceedings are also more cumbersome and expensive for unmarried partners. Other obstacles presented by the inability to enter into a civil marriage include numerous nongovernmental benefits of marriage that are so common in daily life they often go unnoticed, such as something so simple as spousal health club memberships."

The plaintiffs sued saying that their "Equal Protection" rights under the Iowa State Constitution are being violated by the ban on same-sex marriage.

Regarding "Equal Protection", the Court quoted a statement claiming that it,"is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."

"The legal concept of 'scrutiny' involves how much we allow a law to infringe upon our rights in order to address a legitimate government concern. It's a balancing act between anarchy and totalitarianism. Examples of varying degrees of scrutiny can be found in many areas such as Freedom of Religion - Should we allow child sacrifice? Should we allow the handling of poisonous snakes? Should wine be allowed to be given to children during services? Should we have prayer/Bible reading in public schools? Should schools allow Muslim kids to pray during class when the time comes? Other examples involve the use of government looking at library records and listening to phone calls in its effort to fight terrorism. All laws have to justify their existence by showing that they address legitimate government interests while respecting civil rights as much as possible while addressing that legitimate government interest."

"The more fundamental of a right the government seeks to infringe, the closer scrutiny the government's actions receive from the courts." (The three main levels of scrutiny - Rational Basis, Intermediate/Heightened Scrutiny, and Strict Scrutiny are discussed in detail in this essay on our site dealing with other Courts' rulings regarding scrutiny and equal protection).

"Under the rational basis test, '[t]he plaintiff has the heavy burden of showing the statute unconstitutional and must negate every reasonable basis upon which the classification may be sustained.' Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579, 80 (Iowa 1980). In deference to the legislature, a statute will satisfy the requirements of the equal protection clause 'so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.'"

"(The) intermediate tier has been applied to statutes classifying on the basis of gender or illegitimacy and requires the party seeking to uphold the statute to demonstrate the challenged classification is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective. It is known as 'intermediate scrutiny' or 'heightened scrutiny,'"

"Thus, courts apply a heightened level of scrutiny under equal protection analysis when reasons exist to suspect 'prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.'"

"Classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin and those affecting fundamental rights are evaluated according to a standard known as 'strict scrutiny.' Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 1998). Classifications subject to strict scrutiny are presumptively invalid and must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."

"To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations."

"Instead, equal protection demands that laws treat alike all people who are 'similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes of the law.'"

"The County references this threshold test in this case and asserts the plaintiffs are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples so as to necessitate further equal protection analysis because the plaintiffs cannot 'procreate naturally.' In other words, the County argues the statute does not treat similarly situated persons differently, but merely treats dissimilar persons differently."

"In other words, to truly ensure equality before the law, the equal protection guarantee requires that laws treat all those who are similarly situated with respect to the purposes of the law alike."

"The purposes of the law must be referenced in order to meaningfully evaluate whether the law equally protects all people similarly situated with respect to those purposes. For these reasons, the trait asserted by the County is insufficient to support its threshold argument."

"(W)ith respect to the subject and purposes of Iowa's marriage laws, we find that the plaintiffs are similarly situated compared to heterosexual persons. Plaintiffs are in committed and loving relationships, many raising families, just like heterosexual couples. Moreover, official recognition of their status provides an institutional basis for defining their fundamental relational rights and responsibilities, just as it does for heterosexual couples. Society benefits, for example, from providing same- sex couples a stable framework within which to raise their children and the power to make health care and end-of-life decisions for loved ones, just as it does when that framework is provided for opposite-sex couples.
In short, for purposes of Iowa's marriage laws, which are designed to bring a sense of order to the legal relationships of committed couples and their families in myriad ways, plaintiffs are similarly situated in every important respect, but for their sexual orientation. As indicated above, this distinction cannot defeat the application of equal protection analysis through the application of the similarly situated concept because, under this circular approach, all distinctions would evade equal protection review. Therefore, with respect to the government's purpose of 'providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons,' same-sex couples are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples."

"Thus, the right of a gay or lesbian person under the marriage statute to enter into a civil marriage only with a person of the opposite sex is no right at all."
(The same argument was made in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). In that case, the US Supreme Court struck down a state miscegenation (anti mixed-race marriage) law because it interfered with the constitutional right to marry despite the fact that the plaintiffs could marry others of their own race.)

"Under intermediate scrutiny, the relationship between the government's goal and the classification employed to further that goal must be 'substantial'."

"By purposefully placing civil marriage outside the realistic reach of gay and lesbian individuals, the ban on same-sex civil marriages differentiates implicitly on the basis of sexual orientation. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 431 n.24; Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 605 (Md. 2007). Thus, we proceed to analyze the constitutionality of the statute based on sexual orientation discrimination."

"To determine if this particular classification violates constitutional principles of equal protection, we must next ask what level of scrutiny applies to classifications of this type. The County argues the more deferential rational basis test should apply, while plaintiffs argue closer scrutiny is appropriate. Although neither we nor the United States Supreme Court has decided which level of scrutiny applies to legislative classifications based on sexual orientation, numerous Supreme Court equal protection cases provide a general framework to guide our analysis."

"Classifications based on factors like race, alienage, national origin, sex, or illegitimacy are 'so seldom relevant to achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.' Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S. Ct. at 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 320. Rather than bearing some relationship to the burdened class's ability to contribute to society, such classifications often reflect irrelevant stereotypes. Id. at 440-41, 105 S. Ct. at 3254-55, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 320-21. 'For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means,' laws based on these types of classifications must withstand more intense judicial scrutiny than other types of classifications. Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain legislative classifications warrant more demanding constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court has looked to four factors."

"The Supreme Court has considered: (1) the history of invidious discrimination against the class burdened by the legislation; (2) whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a typical class member's ability to contribute to society; (3) whether the distinguishing characteristic is 'immutable' or beyond the class members' control; and (4) the political power of the subject class. In considering whether sexual orientation is a suspect class, a number of our sister jurisdictions have referenced similar factors."

"1. History of discrimination against gay and lesbian people." The first consideration is whether gay and lesbian people have suffered a history of purposeful unequal treatment because of their sexual orientation... (T)his history of discrimination suggests any legislative burdens placed on lesbian and gay people as a class "are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14, 102 S. Ct. at 2394 n.14, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 799 n.14. This observation favors an elevated scrutiny to uncover any such prejudice.

"2. Sexual orientation and the ability to contribute to society." A second relevant consideration is whether the characteristic at issue "sexual orientation" is related to the person's ability to contribute to society. Heightened scrutiny is applied when the classification bears no relationship to a person's ability to contribute to society. The existence of this factor indicates the classification is likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 453. A classification unrelated to a person's ability to perform or contribute to society typically reflects 'prejudice and antipathy' a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others' or 'reflect[s] outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of persons with the characteristic.'

3. Immutability of sexual orientation. The parties, consistent with the same-sex-marriage scholarship, opinions, and jurisprudence, contest whether sexual orientation is immutable or unresponsive to attempted change. The County seizes on this debate to argue the summary judgment granted by the district court in this case was improper because plaintiffs could not prove, as a matter of fact, that sexuality is immutable. This argument, however, essentially limits the constitutional relevance of mutability to those instances in which the trait defining the burdened class is absolutely impervious to change. To evaluate this argument, we must first consider the rationale for using immutability as a factor."

"Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.' Put another way, when a characteristic is immutable, different treatment based on this characteristic seems "all the more invidious and unfair."

"(W)e agree with those courts that have held the immutability 'prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied when . . . the identifying trait is 'so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change [it].' "

"4. Political powerlessness of lesbian and gay people. As observed, the political power of the burdened class has been referenced repeatedly in Supreme Court cases determining the level of scrutiny to be applied to a given piece of legislation. Unfortunately, the Court has never defined what it means to be politically powerless for purposes of this analysis, nor has it quantified a maximum amount of political power a group may enjoy while still receiving the protection from unfair discrimination accompanying heightened scrutiny. The County points to the numerous legal protections gay and lesbian people have secured against discrimination, and the County argues those protections demonstrate gay and lesbian people are not a politically powerless class. The County's argument implies gay and lesbian people must be characterized by a complete, or nearly complete, lack of political power before courts should subject sexual-orientation-based legislative burdens to a heightened scrutiny.
Notwithstanding the lack of a mathematical equation to guide the analysis of this factor, a number of helpful general principles related to the political power of suspect classes can be culled from the Supreme Court's cases. First, these cases show absolute political powerlessness is not necessary to subject legislative burdens on a certain class to heightened scrutiny. For example, females enjoyed at least some measure of political power when the Supreme Court first heightened its scrutiny of gender classifications."

"(T)he political powerlessness factor of the level-of-scrutiny inquiry does not require a showing of absolute political powerlessness. Rather, the touchstone of the analysis should be 'whether the group lacks sufficient political strength to bring a prompt end to the prejudice and discrimination through traditional political means.' It is also important to observe that the political power of gays and lesbians, while responsible for greater acceptance and decreased discrimination, has done little to remove barriers to civil marriage. Additionally, gay and lesbian people are, as a class, currently no more powerful than women or members of some racial minorities."

"5. Classifications based on sexual orientation demand closer scrutiny.

H. Application of Heightened Scrutiny.

"1. Intermediate scrutiny standard. 'To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.' Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L. Ed. 2d 465, 472 (1988). In applying an intermediate standard to review gender-based classifications, the Supreme Court has stated: 'Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive.' 'To this end, courts evaluate whether the proffered governmental objectives are important and whether the statutory classification is 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'"

"2. Statutory classification: exclusion of gay and lesbian people from civil marriage. Thus, the question we must answer is whether excluding gay and lesbian people from civil marriage is substantially related to any important governmental objective."

"3. Governmental objectives. The County has proffered a number of objectives supporting the marriage statute. These objectives include support for the 'traditional' institution of marriage, the optimal procreation and rearing of children, and financial considerations."

"a. Maintaining traditional marriage. First, the County argues the same-sex marriage ban promotes the 'integrity of traditional marriage' by 'maintaining the historical and traditional marriage norm ([as] one between a man and a woman).' This argument is straightforward and has superficial appeal. A specific tradition sought to be maintained cannot be an important governmental objective for equal protection purposes, however, when the tradition is nothing more than the historical classification currently expressed in the statute being challenged."

"Consequently, equal protection demands that 'the classification ([that is], the exclusion of gay [persons] from civil marriage) must advance a state interest that is separate from the classification itself.' "

"b. Promotion of optimal environment to raise children. Another governmental objective proffered by the County is the promotion of 'child rearing by a father and a mother in a marital relationship which social scientists say with confidence is the optimal milieu for child rearing.' This objective implicates the broader governmental interest to promote the best interests of children. The 'best interests of children' is, undeniably, an important governmental objective. Yet, we first examine the underlying premise proffered by the County that the optimal environment for children is to be raised within a marriage of both a mother and a father."

"Plaintiffs presented an abundance of evidence and research, confirmed by our independent research, supporting the proposition that the interests of children are served equally by same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents. On the other hand, we acknowledge the existence of reasoned opinions that dual-gender parenting is the optimal environment for children. These opinions, while thoughtful and sincere, were largely unsupported by reliable scientific studies."

"The plaintiffs produced evidence to demonstrate sexual orientation and gender have no effect on children raised by same-sex couples, and same-sex couples can raise children as well as opposite-sex couples. They also submitted evidence to show that most scientific research has repudiated the commonly assumed notion that children need opposite-sex parents or biological parents to grow into well-adjusted adults. Many leading organizations, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the National Association of Social Workers, and the Child Welfare League of America, weighed the available research and supported the conclusion that gay and lesbian parents are as effective as heterosexual parents in raising children."

"Almost every professional group that has studied the issue indicates children are not harmed when raised by same-sex couples, but to the contrary, benefit from them. In Iowa, agencies that license foster parents have found same-sex couples to be good and acceptable parents. The district court concluded the statute was unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Iowa Constitution and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs."

"Under intermediate scrutiny, the relationship between the government's goal and the classification employed to further that goal must be 'substantial.' In order to evaluate that relationship, it is helpful to consider whether the legislation is over-inclusive or under-inclusive. See RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 10 (considering under-inclusion and over-inclusion even in the rational basis context).
A statute is under-inclusive when the classification made in the statute 'does not include all who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.' Tussman & tenBroek, 37 Cal. L. Rev. at 348. An under-inclusive statute means all people included in the statutory classification have the trait that is relevant to the aim of the statute, but other people with the trait are not included in the classification. A statute is over-inclusive when the classification made in the statute includes more persons than those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. See id. at 351. An over-inclusive statute 'imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those' with the trait relevant to the aim of the law."

"If the statute was truly about the best interest of children, some benefit to children derived from the ban on same-sex civil marriages would be observable. Yet, the germane analysis does not show how the best interests of children of gay and lesbian parents, who are denied an environment supported by the benefits of marriage under the statute, are served by the ban. Likewise, the exclusion of gays and lesbians from marriage does not benefit the interests of those children of heterosexual parents, who are able to enjoy the environment supported by marriage with or without the inclusion of same-sex couples."

"The ban on same-sex civil marriage can only logically be justified as a means to ensure the asserted optimal environment for raising children if fewer children will be raised within same-sex relationships or more children will be raised in dual-gender marriages."

"c. Promotion of procreation. If procreation is the true objective, then the proffered classification must work to achieve that objective. Even if possibly true, the link between exclusion of gay and lesbian people from marriage and increased procreation is far too tenuous to withstand heightened scrutiny. Specifically, the statute is significantly under-inclusive with respect to the objective of increasing procreation because it does not include a variety of groups that do not procreate for reasons such as age, physical disability, or choice. In other words, the classification is not substantially related to the asserted legislative purpose."

"d. Promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships. A fourth suggested rationale supporting the marriage statute is 'promoting stability in opposite sex relationships.' While the institution of civil marriage likely encourages stability in opposite-sex relationships, we must evaluate whether excluding gay and lesbian people from civil marriage encourages stability in opposite- sex relationships. The County offers no reasons that it does, and we can find none."

"e. Conservation of resources. The conservation of state resources is another objective arguably furthered by excluding gay and lesbian persons from civil marriage. The argument is based on a simple premise: couples who are married enjoy numerous governmental benefits, so the state's fiscal burden associated with civil marriage is reduced if less people are allowed to marry. In the common sense of the word, then, it is 'rational' for the legislature to seek to conserve state resources by limiting the number of couples allowed to form civil marriages."

"Conclusion. Having examined each proffered governmental objective through the appropriate lens of intermediate scrutiny, we conclude the sexual-orientation-based classification under the marriage statute does not substantially further any of the objectives. While the objectives asserted may be important (and many undoubtedly are important), none are furthered in a substantial way by the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage. Our equal protection clause requires more than has been offered to justify the continued existence of the same-sex marriage ban under the statute.
While unexpressed, religious sentiment most likely motivates many, if not most, opponents of same-sex civil marriage and perhaps even shapes the views of those people who may accept gay and lesbian unions but find the notion of same-sex marriage unsettling. Consequently, we address the religious undercurrent propelling the same-sex marriage debate as a means to fully explain our rationale for rejecting the dual-gender requirement of the marriage statute.
The belief that the 'sanctity of marriage' would be undermined by the inclusion of gay and lesbian couples bears a striking conceptual resemblance to the expressed secular rationale for maintaining the tradition of marriage as a union between dual-gender couples, but better identifies the source of the opposition. Whether expressly or impliedly, much of society rejects same-sex marriage due to sincere, deeply ingrained' even fundamental religious belief."

"We, of course, have a constitutional mandate to protect the free exercise of religion in Iowa, which includes the freedom of a religious organization to define marriages it solemnizes as unions between a man and a woman."

"Constitutional Infirmity. We are firmly convinced the exclusion of gay and lesbian people from the institution of civil marriage does not substantially further any important governmental objective. The legislature has excluded a historically disfavored class of persons from a supremely important civil institution without a constitutionally sufficient justification. There is no material fact, genuinely in dispute, that can affect this determination.
We have a constitutional duty to ensure equal protection of the law. Faithfulness to that duty requires us to hold Iowa's marriage statute, Iowa Code section 595.2 violates the Iowa Constitution. To decide otherwise would be an abdication of our constitutional duty. If gay and lesbian people must submit to different treatment without an exceedingly persuasive justification, they are deprived of the benefits of the principle of equal protection upon which the rule of law is founded."

"AFFIRMED. All justices concur. "

As anyone can plainly see, there is no "constitutionally sufficient" nor "exceedingly persuasive justification" to deny same-sex couples their Equal Protection rights under the Constitution to have "Civil Same-Sex Marriage".

Based on the clear logic of the Varnum v. Brien ruling, we LDS need to abandon our opposition to Civil Same-Sex Marriage. Please consider this page of General Authority quotes dealing with civil rights and the scriptural prohibition against infringing upon the civil rights of others.